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Most major American industrial business cycles from around 1880 to the First World War were caused
by fluctuations in the size of the cotton harvest due to economically exogenous factors such as weather.
Wheat and corn harvests did not affect industrial production; nor did the cotton harvest before the
late 1870s. The unique effect of the cotton harvest in this period can be explained as an essentially
monetary phenomenon, the result of interactions between harvests, international gold flows and high-powered
money demand under America’s gold-standard regime of 1879-1914.
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pwrhode@email.arizona.eduEconomists have long been intrigued by the notion that business cycles are caused 
by a few types of identifiable, exogenous shocks.  For the postwar U.S. economy one 
possibility is oil prices, following Hamilton’s (1983) observation that (with one 
exception) the “tendency...for oil price increases to be followed by recessions has in fact 
characterized every recession in the United States since World War II” (p. 229).  The 
apparent relation between oil supply shocks and economic activity has been explained as 
a result of oil prices' real effects on capital productivity and expenditure patterns 
(Hamilton 2000, p. 35), or alternatively as the outcome of monetary shocks resulting 
from policymakers' reactions to oil prices (Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson 1997). 
Up to the mid-twentieth century, the prime suspect was crop harvest fluctuations 
caused by weather and other natural events. William Stanley Jevons (1884) speculated 
that sunspots affected British industrial activity through crop yields in tropical countries.  
Many economists asserted that an effect of harvests on industry was evident in the United 
States (Moore 1914; Robertson 1915; Pigou 1927; H. Stanley Jevons 1933). At the turn 
of the twentieth century, A. Piatt Andrew claimed that “one cannot review the past forty 
years without observing that the beginnings of every movement toward business 
prosperity and the turning-points toward every business decline… were closely connected 
with the out-turn of crops” (1906, p. 351). 
Subsequent research into business cycles did not support such strong claims. In 
their Monetary History of the United States, Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 97-98, 
107, 140-141) argued that the wheat crop, specifically, contributed to a few pre-1914 
cycles, through the effects of wheat export revenues on the U.S. money supply under the 
gold standard. But NBER scholars such as Wesley Mitchell (1951, p. 58), Arthur Burns 
(1951, pp. 7-8), and Robert A. Gordon (1952, p. 386) concluded that farm-sector output 
was uniquely unrelated to output in other sectors. Edwin Frickey (1942, p. 229) found no 
correlations between indices of farm output and his annual index of industrial production 
for 1865-1914.    2
Pre-1914 business cycles remain a topic of current research. They are generally 
found to resemble postwar cycles in the behavior of real variables such as consumption, 
investment and employment (Backus and Kehoe 1992; Romer 1994; Calomiris and 
Hanes 1995; Basu and Taylor 1999). But there has been little recent inquiry into the role 
of agricultural shocks in pre-1914 business cycles. Solomou and Wu (1999) argue that 
weather-related harvest fluctuations affected real GDP in Europe in the late nineteenth 
century, but only because of their direct effects on the agricultural portion of GDP. Odell 
and Weidenmier (2004) argue that the American depression of 1907-08 was the result of 
another type of real shock, the San Francisco earthquake, through the response of central 
banks to international gold flows associated with insurance payments. For the interwar 
(1920s-1930s) period, an extensive modern literature has explored interactions between 
the farm sector and industrial business cycles in the U.S. and elsewhere (e.g. Temin 1976; 
Madsen 2001).  
In this paper, we re-examine the relation between American business cycles and 
harvests of the country’s staple crops – cotton, wheat, and corn – from the early 
nineteenth century to the First World War. We focus specifically on the relation between 
harvests and fluctuations in nonagricultural output indicated by indices of industrial 
production (IP).  Our results should alter views of historical business cycles and attract 
the attention of macroeconomic theorists. 
From about 1880 to 1914, year-to-year fluctuations in the American cotton 
harvest caused business-cycle variations in American IP. Indeed, the cotton harvest 
accounts for most major American business cycles of this era, including the depressions 
of 1884, 1893, 1895 and 1910. The relation between cotton harvests and business cycles 
was causal: it holds for harvest fluctuations due to weather in southern cotton-growing 
regions – a factor exogenous to economic activity and unlikely to affect IP through other 
channels. It was also unique to the cotton crop and to the postbellum era: IP was not 
affected by wheat or corn harvests, or by cotton in the antebellum era. After   3
demonstrating these patterns we propose an essentially monetary explanation. We argue 
that the unique IP effect of the cotton harvest in the postbellum era can be accounted for 
by a standard open-economy sticky-price model, as the outcome of two more proximate 
effects of harvests: on potential high-powered money supply through export revenues, 
and on money demand. In the last section of the paper, we test implications of our 
explanation for monetary quantities, exchange rates, interest rates and inflation.   
I. Pre-1914 data on production in agriculture and industry 
For pre-1914 America, indices of industrial production (IP) are the only reliable 
cyclical-frequency indicators of real activity outside agriculture. For most of the 
nineteenth century the shortest available frequency is annual.
1 The index constructed by 
Joseph Davis (2004) is the most comprehensive and the only one that covers years 
preceding the War Between the States. The Davis index indicates production over 
calendar years from 1790 through 1915. Its year-to-year fluctuations are consistent with 
other cyclical indicators and with the traditional NBER business cycle chronology 
(though several NBER downturns appear in the Davis series as growth slowdowns rather 
than contractions [Davis 2006, pp. 108-109]). Important components enter during 1827, 
so our samples begin with 1828. To avoid possible effects of the First World War's 
outbreak (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p. 196) we present results from samples that end 
with 1913. Samples ending with 1914 gave very similar results.  
Two components of the Davis index are directly related to farm output in a way 
that is undesirable for our purposes: U.S. consumption of raw cotton, and shipments of 
wheat flour.  As a check, we examine a specially-constructed index excluding these two 
components. For postbellum years, we also use the Frickey (1947) annual index of 
manufacturing production.  
                                                 
1 Annual-frequency estimates of aggregate employment and NIPA variables such as GNP are actually 
interpolations on IP series or on nominal variables such as price indexes, suspended between reliable 
estimates for census years only (Rhode 2002; Davis 2004). The monthly IP index constructed by Miron and 
Romer (1990) begins with January 1884.    4
  In American agriculture, the most important products were animals for slaughter 
and three "staple" crops: cotton, wheat, and corn (maize). There are no reliable annual 
estimates of livestock production before about 1910, or of wheat and corn production in 
the antebellum era.
2 But beginning with 1866, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) produced reliable annual estimates of production of all three staple crops, based 
mainly on information provided by local crop reporters. For cotton alone, the USDA 
published annual production estimates for antebellum and war years, based on 
contemporary commercial estimates (Carter et. al. 2006, series Da 696, Da718, Da756). 
Thus, we can examine harvest fluctuations of cotton, wheat and corn in the postbellum 
era, and of cotton alone in the antebellum era. In the years just following the War 
Between the States, cotton production was subject to many special factors (described by 
Ransom and Sutch 1977) beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, we begin postbellum 
samples with 1869. Starting samples a few years earlier or later gave similar results. 
We measure business-cycle industrial fluctuations as deviation from trend in log 
IP series - the “IP gap.” We define business-cycle industrial fluctuations as deviations 
from estimated trends in the log of IP series, with trends estimated separately over 1828-
1860 and 1869-1913. To span most definitions of cyclical fluctuations versus trends, we 
estimate trends two ways: quadratic in time; and using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter 
with the smoothing parameter set at the value (100) used by most other studies of annual 
historical data (such as Backus and Kehoe 1992). As is well known, the HP filter 
incorporates some relatively high-frequency movements into the trend; the quadratic does 
                                                 
2 For years from 1867 on, the USDA assembled annual estimates of the number of head of livestock on 
farms reproduced in Carter et. al. 2006, series Da968-973), rather than output of slaughtered meat. From 
these USDA "inventory" numbers, Strauss and Bean (1940, pp. 105-123) created estimates of slaughtered 
meat output by assuming that a fixed fraction of the livestock headcount in each animal category (cattle, 
hogs, sheep) was slaughtered every year, and applying estimates of livestock weights derived from 
incomplete records of commercial slaughterhouses.  Though they are given on an annual basis, we believe 
the Strauss and Bean estimates indicate long-term trends in livestock production rather than annual 
fluctuations, which would be affected by variations in the slaughtered fraction of the headcount, animal 
mortality from diseases versus slaughter, and so on.    5
not.
3  
We define crop harvest fluctuations parallel to IP gaps, as deviations of log output 
from the two trends. Figure I plots output of each crop and quadratic trends, which appear 
to be good descriptions of long-term growth. Table I presents statistics on volatility, 
persistence and cross-correlations for harvest fluctuations and IP gaps. IP gaps are 
persistent (high serial correlation) and slightly more volatile in the postbellum era. 
Harvest fluctuations are not at all persistent; volatility is similar across crops and eras. 
None of the cross-correlations is strong.  
II. Staple crops in the American economy 
Crop production was fundamentally seasonal and regional. Cotton, wheat and 
corn were all harvested within the months from July through November, planted in the 
previous spring or earlier. Cotton was grown in the southern "cotton belt" from North 
Carolina to Texas. The bulk of industrial production took place elsewhere, in the 
Northeast and Midwest. Wheat and corn were concentrated in the "grain belt" of the 
Midwest and West, closer to industrial centers but far from the cotton belt.
4   
Almost all harvested cotton was sold off the farm for factory textile production. 
Most was exported, primarily to Britain, which had the world’s largest cotton textile 
industry. Most harvested wheat was sold off the farm to be milled into flour for human 
consumption (some was retained for seed and animal feed). Unlike cotton and wheat, 
most corn was fed to draft and meat animals, often on the same farm where it was grown 
                                                 
3 Ravn and Uhlig (2002) show that a smoothing-parameter value of 6.25 for annual-frequency data would 
be more consistent with the value of 1600 conventionally applied to quarterly- data. Compared with a  
value of 100, a value of 6.25 would create trends that are even more sensitive to short-term fluctuations.   
4 Cotton was planted from March through May, harvested beginning in August (Covert 1912, p. 93). By the 
end of October over sixty percent of the cotton harvest was completed, at least in the 1900s (U.S. Bureau of 
the Census 1909, p. 13). Corn was planted in the spring, harvested from early September through 
November (Covert 1912, p. 17). "Winter wheat" was planted from September through October; "spring 
wheat" was planted from March through May; both wheat plantings were harvested mostly in July and 
August (Covert 1912, pp. 30, 41; Monthly Crop Reporter Sept. 1920, p. 100). In the postbellum era about 
70 percent of U.S. wheat came from Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Indiana, 
Missouri, the Dakotas, Kansas and Nebraska (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1955). Over 1910-1914, 
about sixty percent of corn came from Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, Indiana, Nebraska, Ohio and Kansas (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture 1954). In the late nineteenth century the cotton belt states developed a large   6
(USDA 1922, pp. 79, 151-155, 164-165, 199-201, 391-399). The U.S. produced most of 
the world’s marketed cotton, even as late as 1913; the U.S. share of world wheat was 
much smaller (USDA 1921, pp. 547-548). 
Table II indicates crops’ roles in U.S. exports and national income. (Underlying 
figures on crop values and sales incorporate estimates of output retained on the farm [for 
wheat and corn] and local prices available to farmers [as distinct from central commodity 
market prices] appear reliable for these long-run averages, though not from year to year.) 
The value of raw cotton as a share of U.S. export revenue or relative to GNP fell from the 
antebellum to the postbellum era. In the postbellum era, the cotton and wheat harvests 
had similar value relative to GNP and generated similar crop sale income to farmers. 
Cotton was a larger share of export revenue, and had a higher ratio of export revenue to 
crop sales. Corn had the largest value relative to GNP but generated less sales because 
most corn was retained on the farm. The lower section of the Table indicates the 
importance of raw cotton as an input to U.S. and British industry. Raw cotton was always 
more important to the British economy, in the sense that the value of cotton consumed 
and U.S. cotton imports were larger relative to British national product. 
  Relations between harvest fluctuations and U.S. export revenues can be observed 
in annual data on exports by commodity, available starting in the early nineteenth century 
for twelve-month spans corresponding to one harvest season’s exports. These data show 
that cotton harvest fluctuations were not related to U.S. export revenue in the antebellum 
era. In the postbellum era, both cotton and wheat harvest fluctuations were positively 
related to export revenue with similar magnitudes. Corn harvest fluctuations were not 
strongly related to export revenue. Table III presents results indicating these patterns. We 
regressed the log of total revenue from crop-related exports - the sum of raw cotton, 
wheat and wheat flour, corn and corn flour - on the corresponding season’s harvest 
fluctuations (quadratic trends), time trend terms, and the log of the WPI over the twelve 
                                                                                                                                                 
cotton textile industry, but as late as 1895 northern mills accounted for two-thirds of U.S. raw cotton 
consumption (Hammond 1897, p. 343).   7
months preceding the harvest season (ending June) to control for the general price level. 
The antebellum era's cotton harvest coefficient (column 1) is not significantly different 
from zero. The postbellum cotton harvest coefficient (column 2) is positive and 
significant at the one percent level. When wheat and corn fluctuations are added to the 
right-hand side (column 3), the wheat coefficient is positive, significant at one percent 
and of similar magnitude to cotton's; the corn coefficient is smaller and not significantly 
different from zero at the five percent level. 
  Remaining columns show that these relations between harvests and export 
revenues most likely reflect the behavior of export prices, as roughly indicated by 
observable spot prices in central U.S. commodity markets (New York for cotton, Chicago 
for wheat and corn).
5 Columns (4) and (5) show results of regressing log cotton export 
quantity (in pounds) on harvest fluctuations: coefficients are positive for both the 
antebellum and postbellum eras. For (6) – (9), left-hand side variables were crops’ spot 
prices averaged over the twelve months beginning with the fall harvest season (July 
through the following June). The antebellum cotton harvest coefficient is close to 
negative one, not significantly different from negative one at conventional levels (p-value 
0.67). The postbellum cotton coefficient is negative but smaller in magnitude; the 
hypothesis that it is negative one can be rejected at the one percent level. In (8), wheat 
prices appear largely unrelated to U.S. harvests; in (9) corn prices show a strong negative 
relation to harvests. 
  Wright (1974, p. 630) observed the decrease in the relation between cotton 
harvests and prices from the antebellum to the postbellum period, and argued that it was 
perhaps a consequence of declining U.S. share in world cotton production. We add that 
the development of cotton futures markets, which occurred over the 1860s, may have 
                                                 
5 Actual export prices are unobservable. In the antebellum period, cotton was sold in many port cities and 
cotton prices varied substantially across ports (Hammond 1897, pp. 278-291; Woodman 1968, pp. 19-42). 
For many ports prices are unavailable, as is the fraction of exports sold at a given local price (cotton 
shipped from a given port was not necessarily sold by the exporter at that port’s price).  In the postbellum 
period, there was tighter correlation of prices across local markets, but there were active futures markets 
(Stevens 1887), so spot prices are not necessarily equal to export prices.   8
dampened the sensitivity of world cotton prices to short-run supply disturbances.
6  The 
weak relation between wheat prices and U.S. harvests is consistent with the small U.S. 
share of world wheat supply. Because wheat prices were largely unrelated to U.S. 
harvests, U.S. wheat harvests' effects on export revenues were similar to cotton's, even 
though wheat was a smaller share of export revenue on average. 
III. Causes of harvest fluctuations 
  What caused harvest fluctuations? Were they driven by business cycles (through 
demand for crops, for example), or by some third factor or factors that affected both 
agriculture and industry? We begin to answer these questions by regressing autumn 
harvest fluctuations on IP gaps for the same calendar year and the previous year. Given 
the fundamental lag between planting and harvest, there is no reason to believe a 
common third factor could affect crop output before IP. Thus, effects on harvests of 
business cycles or common third factors should appear as positive coefficients on IP 
gaps. For cotton and corn, these regressions give no evidence that harvest fluctuations 
were caused by business cycles or common third factors. For the wheat crop only, there is 
evidence of a relation between the harvest and IP in the same year. 
  Table IV shows results. The last rows show p-values to test hypotheses that 
coefficients on all right-hand side variables are zero, and that the two IP gap coefficients 
are zero. For cotton and corn, one cannot reject the hypothesis that all variables’ 
coefficients are zero. For the wheat crop only, the coefficient on the current-year IP gap 
is positive and significant at conventional levels. 
  The apparently weak relations between autumn harvests and IP of the same 
calendar year are consistent with observations of early NBER researchers, who found no 
conformity between business cycles and indices of crop output or farm employment 
(Burns 1951, pp. 7-8; Gordon 1952, pp. 385-387; Kuznets 1951, p. 159). Mitchell (1951 
pp. 56, 57) concluded that "the basic industry of growing crops does not expand and 
                                                 
6 Textile manufacturers and middlemen used futures to hedge the risk of a decrease in the value of their 
stocks of cotton, which allowed them to hold larger stocks (Hammond 1897, pp. 300-314; Woodman 1968,   9
contract in unison with mining, manufacturing, trading, transportations and finance" 
because "farmers cannot control the short-term fluctuations in their output...the factor that 
dominates year-to-year changes in the harvests is that intricate complex called weather. 
Plant diseases and insect pests also exert an appreciable influence." 
  Weather, plant diseases and pests are indeed plausible causes of harvest 
fluctuations, as we have defined them. Many fluctuations apparent in Figure I are 
coincident with events of this type noted by contemporary observers (such as, for cotton, 
cotton worm infestation in 1846 and the early 1870s, boll worms in 1881, the boll weevil 
in 1909 and 1915; the Mississippi flood in 1892 [Thorp 1926]). Their effects are also 
consistent with the absence of serial correlation in harvest fluctuations.  Long-run effects 
of most newly-introduced crop diseases and pests were mitigated by innovations in 
agricultural technique (Olmstead and Rhode 2002). Year-to-year effects depended on 
interactions with weather. For example, the boll weevil, which began to affect U.S. cotton 
production in 1892, caused most damage in years of especially wet, warm weather 
(Henry 1925, p. 523; Kincer 1928). 
IV. Effects of harvests on industrial production 
  To observe the effects of harvest fluctuations on business cycles, we begin by 
running OLS regressions of IP gaps on lagged IP gaps and the previous fall’s harvest 
fluctuations. Results indicate a positive relation of very high statistical significance 
between a year’s IP gap and the previous fall’s cotton harvest, within the postbellum era 
only. There is no such relation for the postbellum wheat or corn harvests, or for the cotton 
harvest in the antebellum era. 
  Next, we ask whether cotton harvests were related to IP throughout the 
postbellum era, or only within a portion of the era. Given the small number of 
observations in question, we cannot claim definitive evidence on this point. However, in 
a variety of specifications the relation between cotton harvests and IP does not appear 
                                                                                                                                                 
289-294); larger stocks could dampen price effects of short-run supply fluctuations.   10
within the 1870s, though it holds in every other decade from the 1880s through 1913.  
  Finally, to establish the direction of causality between cotton harvests and IP, we 
observe the effect of harvest fluctuations specifically due to weather, using time-series 
weather data in two-stage least squares. Recall we have found no reason to believe any 
cotton harvest fluctuations reflect reverse causation from IP or common effects of third 
factors. But the natural experiments created by weather events reveal causality in an 
unusually definitive way. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, if not the 
twenty-first, weather was unaffected by industrial activity. There is no reason to believe 
that weather relevant for cotton could affect IP through channels other than the cotton 
harvest. Industrial production might be affected by northern weather – for example, an 
especially cold winter could hinder shipping by freezing waterways. But cotton-growing 
was affected by southern weather. Our IV results confirm that the post-1870s relation 
between the cotton harvest and the following year’s IP was one of cause and effect. They 
are also consistent with the absence of effects from wheat and corn.   
  IV.A) OLS regressions 
  Table V, panel A shows results of regressing IP gaps on two lags of IP gaps and 
harvest fluctuations. IP indexes are the standard Davis series, the Davis series excluding 
cotton textiles and flour, and sector-specific Davis series for two industries particularly 
far removed from crop inputs: metals (mainly iron and steel), and machinery. The last 
column shows results from the Frickey index of manufacturing production. In all cases, 
whether or not the postbellum sample includes the 1870s, the postbellum era's coefficient 
on the previous year's cotton harvest is positive and significantly different from zero at 
the two percent level or better; wheat and corn coefficients are not significantly different 
from zero (and are sometimes negative in sign). The antebellum era's cotton harvest 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. In most cases coefficients on the 
second lags of crop harvests and IP gaps are not significantly different from zero, 
individually or jointly (p-values in the last row of the Table). Excluding second lags from   11
the right-hand side, in panel B, has little effect on coefficients on the previous fall's 
harvests.  
Scatterplots of the first-difference of (log) IP gap against the previous fall’s 
harvest fluctuations should give good representations of the results in Table V, because 
estimated coefficients on the previous year's IP gap are close to one, and correlations 
across different crops’ harvest fluctuations are low. Figure II A) is a scatterplot for the 
cotton harvest (standard Davis series, quadratic time trends) in the postbellum period. For 
comparison, Figures II) B) C) and D) show scatterplots for the antebellum cotton harvest 
and the wheat and corn harvests. The unique postbellum relation between cotton harvests 
and IP is apparent. The outlier is 1908 (harvests of fall 1907). 
V. B) The 1870s versus the rest of the postbellum era   
To observe whether cotton harvests were related to IP throughout the postbellum 
era, we examine the year-by-year correspondence between IP gaps and “forecasts” of IP 
gaps based cotton harvest fluctuations. We look at forecasts derived from two different 
regressions: the IP gap regressed on the previous two years’ cotton harvest fluctuations; 
and the IP gap regressed on the previous year's IP gap and cotton harvest. To produce the 
forecast from the second regression, values for lagged IP gaps were lagged forecast 
values (except for 1869 and 1870), so that both sets of forecast values are determined by 
cotton harvests alone. 
Figure III plots actual and forecast IP gaps for quadratic and HP trends (each 
trend type defines both IP gaps and cotton harvest fluctuations). From the beginning of 
the 1880s on, most of the big swings in IP forecast by cotton harvests appear in the actual 
IP gap. Cotton harvests account for the IP peak around 1881 and the downturn to a trough 
in 1885; the depression of 1893, the brief 1894 upturn and the downturn in 1895; the 
trough in 1904; and the depression of 1910-1911. Indeed, among the major depressions 
after 1880, cotton harvests fail to account for only one: 1907-1908. We conclude that 
cotton harvests were related to nonagricultural business cycles throughout the period   12
from the beginning of the 1880s to the First World War. 
Within the 1870s, there is not clear evidence of a relation between cotton harvests 
and the IP gap. The actual IP gap falls from a peak in 1873 to a trough in 1875 or around 
1877 (depending on trend definition), then rises through the end of the decade to the 1881 
peak. The IP swings forecast by cotton harvests are clearly different in the early 1870s - a 
sharp downturn from 1871 and an upturn around 1873 - though they are arguably 
consistent with the actual IP recovery in the later 1870s. 
Given the small number of observations at issue and the difficulties of dating 
nineteenth-century business cycles, we do not claim to precisely date the inception of the 
relation between cotton harvests and nonagricultural production, but we cautiously 
conclude that it did not exist throughout the 1870s: it may have come into force at the end 
of that decade or within its later years. 
Without attempting to distinguish between years within the 1870s, we apply tests 
to observe whether there is a statistically significant difference between the 1870s as a 
whole and the rest of the postbellum era in the cotton harvest-IP relation. Table VI shows 
results of regressing IP gaps on the previous year's IP gap and cotton harvest, a dummy 
variable for observations 1870-1879, and an interaction between the dummy and the 
cotton harvest. If IP gaps were unrelated to the cotton harvest within the 1870s, the 
interaction-term coefficient should be negative and the sum of the interaction coefficient 
and the cotton harvest coefficient should be close to zero, meaning that the cotton harvest 
coefficient specific to 1870-1879 is zero. Also, the cotton harvest coefficient should be 
larger than that from the corresponding specifications in Table V B). These patterns hold 
for all variants.  
To see whether the 1870s years were unique in the absence of a cotton harvest 
effect on IP, for each trend definition we ran 35 separate OLS regressions, defining 
dummy and interaction terms for each successive ten-year span: one regression with 
dummy and interaction terms defined for 1871-1880; another with terms defined for   13
1872-1881; and so on. Figure IV) plots the resulting coefficients on the cotton harvest, 
and the sums of the cotton harvest coefficient and the interaction term, with the last year 
of each ten-year span on the horizontal axis. (Thus, coefficients from Table VI are plotted 
at 1879.) The 1870s are indeed unique: no span outside the 1870s gives a shift coefficient 
that is negative and close in magnitude to the cotton-harvest coefficient; defining the shift 
terms for the 1870s maximizes the cotton-harvest coefficient. 
  V. C) IV results 
The civilian U.S. Weather Bureau, founded in 1891, took over and expanded data-
gathering operations that had been handled earlier by a variety of Federal agencies, and 
began to publish state-level monthly average temperatures and precipitation. In a 
pioneering statistical work, Moore (1917) showed that variations in a number of states' 
cotton harvests over 1894-1914 could be predicted by just three Weather Bureau monthly 
series (May rainfall, July and August temperatures), expressed as deviations from the 
average value across the preceding three years (p. 119). 
To identify the causal nature of the cotton harvest-IP relation through two-stage 
least squares, it is desirable to avoid overfitting the first-stage relation between cotton 
harvests and weather variables. We take our first-stage specification directly from Moore. 
Published Weather Bureau series do not extend back before the late 1880s. But for all of 
the postbellum era - unfortunately, not for the antebellum era - we were able to construct 
measures of these three weather variables for the cotton belt states as a whole, from 
databases giving observations by thousands of individual weather stations. The data 
appendix gives details. Following Moore, we converted the series into deviations from 
the preceding three years' average value. To allow for possible changes in weather effects 
due to the arrival of the boll weevil, and for differences in the nature of the weather data 
associated with the establishment of the civilian Weather Bureau, we allow the first-stage  
weather coefficients (and the constant) to differ before 1892. 
For comparison, we performed parallel exercises for wheat and corn. Guided by   14
early twentieth-century studies of weather effects on these crops’ harvests (Moore 1920; 
Hanney 1931; Henry et. al. 1925; Kincer and Mattice 1928; and Mattice 1931), we chose 
four variables to predict wheat (January and May temperatures, June precipitation, and 
precipitation in the October preceding the harvest, as some harvest-season wheat - 
“winter” wheat – had been planted in the previous fall) and four for corn (July and 
August precipitation, April and July temperature). We constructed these variables from 
observations by grain belt states' weather stations (data appendix). Otherwise our first-
stage specifications for wheat and corn were the same as for cotton.  
Table VII A indicates the quality of these instruments with R2’s, and F-statistics 
with associated p-values, from regressions of harvest fluctuations (quadratic trends) on 
each crop’s set of weather variables. We have fairly strong instruments for all three crops 
within the 1880-1913 period, though not for wheat over the longer 1870-1913 period.
7 
No crop’s weather variables are strongly related to harvests of other crops.  
Table VIII) panel A) shows results of 2SLS regressions for 1870-1913 and 1880-
1913; matching OLS regressions are in panel B). For the first three columns, 
specifications follow Table V, panel B, with IP gaps regressed on the previous year’s IP 
gap and harvest fluctuation (quadratic). For the last three columns, the first difference of 
log IP was regressed on the previous year’s harvest fluctuation alone. 
In both specifications, coefficients on cotton harvests are positive and significant 
at one percent. Coefficients on wheat and corn are not significantly different from zero, 
and are close to zero in magnitude. Other IP series and HP trends gave similar results. 
V. Explaining harvests’ effects on IP 
Why did cotton harvests affect U.S. IP in the postbellum era but not in the 
antebellum era, when raw cotton was a larger share of U.S. national income? Why did 
wheat and corn harvests fail to affect IP even though their shares of national income were 
similar to cotton’s? In the remaining sections of the paper, we briefly consider and reject   15
a “real” explanation of these patterns suggested by the literature on oil-price shocks. At 
greater length, we propose and test a monetary explanation. 
V. A) A real explanation? Cotton harvests as shocks to raw material supply 
The modern real business cycle literature has not dealt with harvest shocks as 
such.
8 The persistent productivity shocks depicted in RBC models are essentially 
different from harvest fluctuations as we have defined them. Crop output variations 
caused by weather, for example, affect the outcome of factor inputs applied in the past, 
not expected productivity of current or future inputs. There is no sense in which a large 
cotton harvest could boost nonagricultural output by releasing labor from the agricultural 
sector: it took more labor to bring in a larger crop (Parker 1991, pp. 61-63). 
However, models of oil shocks as disruptions to the supply of a sector-specific 
raw material input (e.g. Hamilton 1988; Aguiar-Conraria and Wen 2007) could perhaps 
be applied to cotton as an input to the textile industry. A test of this approach is to 
observe the relation between U.S. cotton harvests and British IP. Recall that American 
cotton was a more important input to the British industrial economy than to America’s. 
The drastic reduction of cotton supply during the War Between the States had clear 
effects on the British economy (Henderson 1934) which were not apparent in the 
northern U.S. (Hammond 1897, p. 265).  If the cotton harvest affected U.S. IP through 
cotton’s role as a raw material input, there should be similar effects on British IP. To 
check this, we examine the relation between U.S. cotton harvests and Hoffman’s (1955) 
index of British IP, defining IP gaps as for the U.S. We observe no cotton harvest effect 
on British IP in the postbellum era analogous to the U.S. effect. Therefore, we do not 
view this real channel as promising.  
Table IX shows results of regressing each country’s IP gap on the other country’s 
IP gap, its own lagged IP gap, and the lagged U.S. cotton harvest fluctuation. With the 
                                                                                                                                                 
7  This is not surprising, because the geographic location of wheat production changed substantially from 
the 1870s to the 1900s (Olmstead and Rhode 2002, p. 937) and the prior studies guiding our wheat weather 
variable selection date from the twentieth century.   16
U.S. IP gap on the left-hand side, the cotton harvest coefficient is practically zero in the 
antebellum era; but positive and significant at one percent in the postbellum samples. 
With the British IP gap on the left-hand side, the cotton coefficient is very small in 
magnitude and not significantly different from zero for either postbellum sample, though 
it is positive and significant at around the ten percent level for the antebellum era. 
V. B) Monetary explanation 
  In their Monetary History of the United States, Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 
97-99, 107, 140-41) argue that wheat harvest fluctuations contributed to business cycles 
in the period from 1879 to the First World War, through a monetary channel created by 
the U.S. monetary regime of the period. In January 1879, the U.S. Treasury began to 
redeem legal-tender currency dollars (“greenbacks”) in gold, placing the U.S. within the 
international gold standard that had developed over the 1870s (Meissner 2005) and which 
remained in force until the beginning of the First World War, when most countries 
suspended gold convertibility. Under the international gold standard, a country’s 
monetary authorities exchanged domestic high-powered money for gold at a fixed rate. 
Monetary gold flows balanced the difference between net exports and international 
capital outflow. The U.S. had no central bank. High-powered money consisted of 
monetized gold, and nongold currency that the Treasury promised to redeem in gold. The 
high-powered money supply to banks and the public was proximately determined by 
international gold flows reflecting the balance of payments; the rate of growth of nongold 
currency; and the change in the stock of gold held in Treasury vaults, removed from 
banks and the public (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, pp. 124-134). As a bumper crop 
harvest boosted U.S. export revenues it could boost potential money growth, unless this 
effect were counteracted by slower growth in nongold high-powered money or an 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Da-Rocha and Restuccia (2006) show that a large farm sector can amplify real effects of nonagricultural 
productivity shocks in an RBC model, by increasing elasticity of labor supply to nonagricultural sectors.   17
increase in the Treasury gold stock. In fact there is no reason to believe Treasury policy 
tended to counteract the potential effects of crop export revenues in this way.
9 Table X 
shows results of regressing growth in nongold high-powered money and the Treasury 
gold stock on harvest fluctuations: no coefficient is significant at conventional levels. 
Thus, Friedman and Schwartz argued that wheat harvest fluctuations affected high-
powered money-supply growth through net exports, and hence contributed to business 
cycles through a general effect of money-supply shocks on real activity. Fels (1959, pp. 
60, 87, 181, 220) makes a similar argument. 
Oddly, neither Fels nor Friedman and Schwartz mention cotton in this context. 
But pre-1914 contemporaries mentioned cotton along with wheat harvests as affecting 
financial conditions through international gold flows (e.g. Sprague 1903, p. 50; 1915, p. 
500; Andrew 1906). Both crops’ fluctuations were positively related to export revenue in 
the postbellum era, as was indicated by Table III. Within the post-1879 gold standard 
period, volatility in both crops’ export revenues was large enough to affect high-powered 
money supply growth. Table XI shows statistics on high-powered money growth, gold 
inflow across the twelve months from the July preceding a harvest season to the 
following July, and annual crop-related export revenues, all expressed as fractions of the 
preceding July’s money stock. For both cotton and wheat revenues, standard deviations 
and maximum-minimum spreads are large relative to volatility in gold flow or money 
growth.  
A channel from cotton harvests to U.S. IP through international gold flows is 
consistent with the absence of a cotton-harvest effect on British IP. Britain and major 
European countries had central banks that could sterilize the effects of transitory gold 
                                                 
9 Nongold money consisted of greenbacks, silver notes, national banknotes and silver coins. The quantity of 
greenbacks was simply fixed; the rate at which the Treasury created new silver notes was governed by 
longstanding political factors (Myers, 1931, pp. 396-398; 402); and the rate at which banks created national 
bank notes was remarkably insensitive to variations in interest rates and business activity (Myers, 1931, p. 
403; Cagan, 1965, p. 91). On occasion, Treasury officials deliberately managed Treasury vault cash to   18
flows on money supplies, but often responded to persistent gold outflows with actions 
that tended to reduce the money supply and raise interest rates (Sayers 1976). Harvest-
related gold inflows to the U.S. must have been matched by outflows from the outside 
gold-standard world. These may not have been large enough relative to the world gold 
stock to provoke tightening by European central banks, but there is no reason they should 
cause monetary loosening abroad.
10 Table XII shows results of regressing the change in 
British short-term interest rates (July-to-June averages) and the British high-powered 
money supply (July-to-June averages or July-to-July) on U.S. harvest fluctuations: no 
coefficient is significant at conventional levels. 
  A channel through export revenues is also consistent with the absence of a cotton 
harvest effect on U.S. IP in the antebellum era. In that era, the U.S. and most other 
countries active in international trade and investment tied their currencies to gold, silver, 
or both.
11 Friedman (1990) and Flandreau (1996) argue that these various standards 
amounted to a single specie standard essentially similar to the later gold standard. If so, 
the U.S. money supply was linked to export revenues before 1860 as after 1879. 
However, as we showed in section II, within the antebellum era export revenues were 
unrelated to cotton harvest fluctuations, perhaps because cotton prices were more 
sensitive to U.S. harvests than in the postbellum era. 
Finally, a gold-standard monetary channel is consistent with our tentative 
conclusion that cotton harvests began to affect the IP gap at a point prior to the beginning 
of the 1880s, but subsequent to the early 1870s. From 1862 through 1878, legal-tender 
currency dollars traded at a floating rate against gold and specie-linked currencies; their 
supply was unaffected by the trade balance (Friedman and Schwartz, 1960, 54-55). 
                                                                                                                                                 
affect money-market conditions (Myers, 1931, pp. 370-86), but no accounts suggest that they did so in a 
way that would pre-empt the effects of harvest fluctuations. 
10 Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 89 footnote) guessed that the U.S. held less than twenty percent of the 
world monetary gold stock in the late nineteenth century. A theoretical attempt to quantify the possible 
effect of U.S. money-demand variations on world interest rates would be interesting but dubious.  
11 The American dollar was officially bimetallic but effectively silver until 1834, gold after that (Friedman, 
1990).   19
Legislation passed in 1875 promised that gold redemption at the antebellum rate would 
resume in January 1879; this event took place as scheduled.  Thus, the straightforward 
gold-standard link between net exports and the high-powered money supply came into 
effect at the end of the 1870s. That does not rule out the possibility of a different 
monetary channel before 1879. Even before 1879, the U.S. stock of monetary gold, which 
was affected by the trade balance (p. 79), served a number of purposes ordinarily 
associated with high-powered money: Friedman and Schwartz (1960) argue that gold was 
“a second species of money” (p. 58) “used for monetary purposes alongside greenbacks” 
(p. 83), and that as 1879 approached gold became a better way to hold funds for domestic 
purposes because the future dollar-gold exchange rate became more certain (p. 79).
12 
Calomiris (1988) argues that already by 1876 resumption was nearly certain and gold 
flows were related to the money supply, broadly defined. Even on these arguments, 
however, one would not expect a monetary channel to operate until the later 1870s.  
There is one obvious puzzle: why did wheat harvests fail to affect IP? We argue 
that this can be explained as a result of another essentially monetary phenomenon. 
Harvest fluctuations were also positively related to high-powered money demand, so the 
effect of a crop’s harvest on economic activity depended on the strength of its export-
revenue effect relative to its money-demand effect. Money-demand effects of wheat 
harvest fluctuations were stronger relative to the crop’s export revenue effects, so wheat 
harvests failed to affect IP even though they were positively related to export revenue. 
We illustrate this point in a standard Keynesian open-economy model tailored to fit the 
pre-1914 U.S. The model has implications for a variety of available data which we test in 
the final section of the paper.  
Before presenting the model, we explain why money-demand effects of harvests 
                                                 
12 "Gold dollars" - the quantity of gold corresponding to a dollar at the antebellum parity - served as the 
medium of exchange for nearly all purposes in the far West; many bond payments were fixed in gold 
dollars; banks offered gold dollar accounts and held gold reserves (Friedman and Schwartz, 1960, pp. 26-
27, 58, 83) before 1879.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to analyse the domestic monetary role of gold before   20
are plausible, and describe some characteristics of the pre-1914 U.S. economy that guide 
the model’s particular assumptions.  
Harvest effects on money demand 
It is well-known that, in the gold standard period, demand for high-powered 
money was subject to a regular seasonal peak during the fall harvest months, falling off to 
seasonal lows in the summer just before the next harvest season (Kemmerer 1910). A 
modern economics literature has examined the corresponding seasonals in gold flows, 
interest rates and financial market conditions (Goodhart 1968, pp. 51-52; Miron 1986; 
Clark 1986; Barsky, Mankiw, Miron and Weil 1988).  Apart from harvests’ seasonal 
effects on money demand, there is reason to believe that the size of a harvest could affect 
the magnitude of the associated money-demand shock. 
High-powered money was held by banks for payments and reserve requirements, 
and by households and nonbank businesses as cash. Compared with later eras, fewer 
households held bank deposits; cash was a larger share of high-powered money or 
standard monetary aggregates (Cagan 1965, pp. 119-123). To bridge the gap between 
periodic income payments and day-to-day expenses, households without bank accounts 
held cash hoards and used “book” credit extended by merchants (Fisher 1913, p. 81). 
Rural households were especially unlikely to hold bank deposits or make 
payments with checks (Fisher 1913, p. 51; James 1978, pp. 32-33). Contemporaries 
observed that in the harvest season “Farmers require payment very largely in cash to pay 
labourers and frequently for their own use where, as often happens, they have no account 
with a business bank” (Sprague 1903, p. 36). Farmers and laborers used cash hoards 
along with book credit to cover expenses between harvest seasons, including spring 
planting costs and mortgage payments (e.g. Wright 1922, pp. 71, 92; Young 1925, p. 21). 
Farm mortgages were short-term (five years or less); paid off when a farmer’s income 
was high, renewed or allowed to fall into arrears when income was low; payments were 
                                                                                                                                                 
1879 because banking data from the period do not distinguish between greenback dollar and gold dollar 
assets (Kindahl, 1961).     21
made just once a year, usually around May (Murray 1933, p. 381; Hinman and Rankin 
1933, pp. 30-35; Bogue 1955, pp. 53, 66, 72). The Indianapolis Monetary Commission 
(1898, p. 313) described farmers’ use of cash hoards: 
The farmer on selling his crops may indeed receive a check in payment; but as he and a 
large part of the community with which he deals do not find the check and deposit system 
convenient, he is not satisfied with that sort of payment. He cashes the check at the bank, 
or through some merchant, and thus secures the form of currency which he requires. If he 
cashes it with a merchant, a portion may be merely offset against his account at the 
“store” where he deals...But not so with the balance: for that he must have coin or notes. 
Some of this currency is used at once in settling outstanding accounts, and thus gets back 
to the bank almost immediately through the deposits of the tradesmen. To this extent the 
demand is of short duration. The rest of the currency is paid out from time to time during 
the fall and winter for “help,” and in the purchase of the winter’s supplies, or is held in 
cash to meet spring payments on a mortgage. 
 
The seasonal pattern in rural cash demand was an obvious cause of the seasonal in high-
powered money demand. Data on inter-regional cash shipments show massive flows to 
the rural midwest and south from the urban northeast from August through December, 
and return shipments over the following months through the early summer (Kemmerer 
1910, pp. 128-129). 
  Given the cash-intensity of rural economic activity, we propose that large harvests 
tended to boost rural cash demand, not only within the harvest season but also through 
following months. A larger crop might cause farmers to hire more wage labor to bring it 
in, resulting in larger cash wage payments and laborers’ cash-holdings. The behavior of 
commodity-market prices (Table III) suggests that harvest fluctuations were also 
positively related to farmers’ harvest-season income, at least for postbellum wheat and 
cotton. Harvests of these crops could thus be positively related to farmers’ cash-holdings 
– for example, as farm owners made bigger mortgage payments in a high-income year. 
  There is also reason to believe money-demand effects could be stronger for wheat 
than for cotton harvests. Inter-regional cash-shipment data indicate that southern cash 
demand fell off sharply after the harvest season, while midwestern cash demand 
remained high through early summer (Kemmerer 1910, pp. 224-227). Many factors that 
appeared to boost rural cash demand were weaker in the cotton-growing South.   22
Compared with the midwest, a smaller fraction of farms (by number or land area) were 
mortgaged (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1914, pp. 159, 162-163). Cash wages of hired 
labor were a smaller fraction of crop value in cotton than in wheat (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1900, Part II, p. cxxix) and wages were less likely to be paid in cash: “scrip” 
redeemable at a local store was used “especially..in country districts throughout the 
South. These are issued in payment of wages, and reduce the amount of money paid out 
in wages as well as in retail payments” (U.S. Comptroller of the Currency 1894, p. 21; 
see also Woodman 1968, p. 302). “Crop lien” laws, unique to the southern states, allowed 
tenant farmers to finance most expenditures with store credit as they gave a merchant 
creditor a first claim on a tenant’s standing crop (Ransom and Sutch 1977, p. 123). A 
typical northern farmer sold his crop to grain dealers or grain-elevator operators (U.S. 
Industrial Commission 1901, pp. 50, 62-63). A cotton-growing farmer or tenant often 
sold his crop to the same enterprise that furnished him credit between harvests (a factor, 
local merchant or plantation) so that little if any cash changed hands: the sale merely 
reduced a debt or created a credit on the books of the enterprise (Ransom and Sutch 1977, 
p. 123; Brooks 1898, p. 242; Brown 1927, pp. 374-375; Hammond 1896, p. 382; 
Woodman 1968, pp. 288, 302, 308). In the rural south “Merchants are frequently found 
who are unable to give the difference between their cash and credit prices, because none 
of their customers ever buys for cash” (Hammond 1897, p.155). 
  Given these differences between wheat and cotton regions, we propose that the 
money-demand shock associated with the wheat harvest was larger relative to its effect 
on export revenue, not only because wheat crop sales were larger relative to export 
revenue (Table II), but also because of the cotton belt’s peculiar farm credit and tenancy 
institutions.  
  Unfortunately, there are no data to directly indicate effects of harvest fluctuations 
on rural cash demand. Measures of inter-regional cash flows are available for only a few 
years in the 1900s. For most postbellum years there is no way to estimate cash held by   23
the nonbank public (Friedman and Schwartz 1970, p. 208-211), let alone cash held by 
rural households. But money-demand effects can be inferred from the behavior of 
observable variables, given a few more features of the gold-standard economy. 
Other features of the pre-1914 U.S. economy 
Under the gold standard, rates of exchange between financial centers were tied to 
the "parity" value defined by currencies’ gold content. An exchange rate could not remain 
outside the bounds – the “gold points” - that just covered costs of transporting gold 
between the locations. In the U.S. most international payments were negotiated through 
“sight” exchange claims to London sterling funds (even if the ultimate counterparty was 
outside England) purchased from, or sold to, financial institutions in New York City 
(Myers 1931, pp. 338-350). Thus, the effective foreign exchange rate was the New York 
dollar price of London sight exchange, for which data are available from January 1879 
on. The New York-London gold points were narrow enough to hold this rate within a 
range that was too small to make a difference for the relative price of foreign goods. At 
the same time, the exchange rate did vary measurably within the gold points. Thus, the 
direction of international gold flow over a span of months could be reflected in the 
average value of the exchange rate over those months, as the rate was driven to (or 
perhaps just beyond) the gold point for a larger fraction of days.
13   
  As the exchange rate was practically fixed for purposes of foreign trade, dollar 
prices of internationally-traded commodities such as cotton and wheat may have been 
directly determined on international markets. But most U.S. prices were not tied down by 
purchasing-power parity except in the very long run (Diebold, Husted and Rush 1991; 
Lothian and Taylor 1996). Empirical studies of price inflation in the pre-1914 U.S. (e.g. 
Gordon 1990; Backus and Kehoe 1992) generally find a positive relation between real 
                                                 
13 Canjels, Prakash-Canjels and Taylor (2004) observe that from 1879 through 1913 the largest deviation 
from parity in the New York-London rate on any day was 1.06 percent (p. 870). They also argue that the 
marginal costs of shipping gold at a particular point in time increased with the amount of gold shipped. If 
so, the average exchange rate over a period could indicate the direction of gold flow not only because the 
rate was driven to a gold point, but also because the rate on a particular day could range further from parity 
– in effect, the gold points widened - when the gold flow was bigger.   24
activity and the rate of price inflation along the lines of the original Phillips curve, in 
contrast to the “accelerationist” Phillips curve apparent in post-1950s data. The pre-1914 
Philips curve matches a standard expectations-augmented aggregate supply function, 
assuming prices were expected to return to a PPP level in the long run (Alogoskoufis and 
Smith 1991). Thus, the inflation rate could be positively related to output fluctuations 
caused by aggregate demand shocks.  
  The central U.S. financial market, New York, was tightly linked to London, the 
central European market.
14 Financial institutions and individual investors engaged in 
many types of arbitrage between the two cities’ asset markets, responding to differences 
in interest rates and expected future exchange-rate movements within the gold points 
(Goodhart 1969). In London, the benchmark short-term liquid asset was bank-backed 
bills of exchange, for which open-market rate data are available starting in the early 
nineteenth century. As bills of exchange and banker’s acceptances were not traded in the 
U.S., the most comparable American asset was perhaps commercial paper, which was 
actively traded in New York with rate data available from the late 1850s on. Thus, the 
difference between rates on New York commercial paper and London bills indicates the 
international interest-rate spread in this era. 
  The weight of empirical evidence suggests capital flows to the U.S. were sensitive 
to expected rate-of-return differentials, but not infinitely sensitive: uncovered interest-rate 
parity did not hold between New York and London.
15 Thus, it is possible that 
                                                 
14 Bordo and MacDonald (2005) show that short-term interest rates in continental financial centers were 
tightly linked to London’s, less tightly linked from one continental center to another. 
15 Studies have examined whether New York-London interest-rate spreads were related to probable future 
change in exchange rates in a manner consistent with uncovered interest-rate parity. At times, the spread 
obviously exceeded the range of possible future exchange-rate variation assuming the dollar remained tied 
to gold  (Giovannini 1993, pp. 133-136). But financial market participants may have factored in a risk that 
the dollar would be devalued or floated, at least before 1896. Foster (1994) finds clear evidence against 
uncovered interest-rate parity in seasonal patterns: month to month, New York interest rates were relatively 
low just when just when financial market participants should have been expecting a regular seasonal 
depreciation of the dollar. Studies of the covered differential - the spread between London interest rates and 
New York investments that were not subject to the risk of a dollar devaluation - generally indicate that 
covered interest-rate parity failed to hold at business-cycle frequencies  (Obstfeld and Taylor 1998, pp. 
361-363; Juhl, Miles and Weidenmier, 2005). Calomiris and Hubbard (1996) conclude that "Clearly, 
interest rate parity did not hold perfectly across the Atlantic" (p. 195).   25
international capital mobility to the U.S. was imperfect, in the sense that the spread 
between expected returns on U.S. commercial paper and London bills (accounting for 
expected future exchange-rate movements) was positively related to the volume of capital 
flow to the U.S. Before 1896, the spread was also affected by a perceived risk that the 
dollar would again be devalued or floated. This perception largely disappeared after the 
1896 presidential election, which was taken to signal a firm U.S. commitment to the gold 
standard: the long-run trend value of the London-New York spread was narrower after 
the election than it had been over 1879-1896 (Friedman and Schwartz 1982, pp. 515-
517). 
For American banks and investors outside New York, commercial paper was the 
most important (often the only) traded short-term asset: banks all over the country, 
including rural banks, bought commercial paper, in the New York market through the 
agency of a correspondent bank or locally from an agent of a national commercial-paper 
dealer (James 1978, pp. 102, 174-98). Thus, commercial paper rates can be taken to 
indicate the opportunity cost of holding high-powered money, and also banks’ 
opportunity costs of making loans to local borrowers (Sylla 1969).
16 
The bank-credit channel, that is the cost and availability of bank loans as distinct 
from rates on traded assets such as commercial paper, may have been more important 
before 1914 than in later eras (Miron, Romer and Weil 1994). To the degree that credit-
channel disturbances are triggered by changes in market rates (as discussed by Romer 
and Romer 1990, p. 187; Bernanke and Gertler 1995, p.28), this could have tended to 
amplify standard IS effects of interest rates on output. Certainly, the pre-1914 U.S. was 
extraordinarily subject to bank panics, which must have affected the supply of bank loans 
at any given level of short-term market rates. Unfortunately, there are no pre-1914 data 
that indicate changes in required returns to bank lending or the degree of credit rationing 
                                                 
16 Another money-center asset held by banks all across the U.S., and which might represent banks' 
opportunity cost of local loans, was correspondent bank accounts in New York. But the return to holding 
these accounts is unobservable, as it included the value of various services provided by the correspondent 
bank (James, 1978, pp. 103, 109-111).   26
in a straightforward way.
17   
  Model 
To describe the pre-1914 U.S. economy we rely on a textbook “old Keynesian” 
model rather than a “new Keynesian” model, because at least two key features of the pre-
1914 economy for harvests’ possible monetary effects are at odds with simplifying 
assumptions that make New Keynesian models tractable. One is imperfect international 
capital mobility: in standard New-Keynesian open-economy models (e.g. Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler, 2002), uncovered interest-rate parity holds. Another is the nature of rural 
cash demand, in our view essentially related to limited financial-market participation: 
new Keynesian models (including those that allow for money-demand shocks such as 
Ireland [2004]) assume households have access to perfect capital markets and complete 
consumption insurance. Of course, such models may be appropriate to analyse other 
aspects of the pre-1914 U.S. economy.  
In our model, variable levels are average values over a period covering the harvest 
season and following months, ending before the next harvest season. First-differences are 
changes across the same span of time. Variables subscripted (-1) are dated to the 
preceding period. Variables other than interest and inflation rates are logs or deviations of 
logs from long-run trends. Parameters’ signs are positive except where noted.  
The nonagricultural output gap over the post-harvest period, as indicated by the IP 
gap, is:  
(1)   y =  - γr (i - Eπ ) +  γlag y-1  +  εy 
where the real interest rate (i – Eπ) is normalized to trend, and the nominal interest rate i 
corresponds to the period’s average New York commercial paper rate. Eπ is the average 
expected rate of price inflation over corresponding maturities. The disturbance term gy 
reflects all other factors affecting nonagricultural output. To the degree that credit-
                                                 
17 A number of studies (e.g. Bodenhorn 1995) have used pre-1914 bank call reports to calculate the ratio of 
reported earnings from loans to outstanding loan balances. This figure can indicate long-term trends in the 
return to bank loans. Its relation to cyclical-frequency movements is doubtful.      27
channel shocks are triggered by high interest rates, they would boost the magnitude of the 
interest-rate coefficient in (1). 
 Realized  inflation  over  the post-harvest period is: 
(2)   ∆p =  α y   +  εp 
where Δp is the change in the (log) price level across the period and  εp reflects “cost-
push” shocks.  
  High-powered money demand (following standard empirical specifications 
[Goldfeld and Sichel, 1990]) is: 
 (3)   m - p =  μy  y  -  μi  i  +  μlag  ( m-1 - p-1 ) + εmd        where 0 ≤ μlag ≤ 1 
where m is the quantity of high-powered money outside the Treasury and p is the price 
level at the end of the post-harvest period. The change in the money supply across the 
harvest and post-harvest period is: 
(4)   ∆m = g  + εms 
g is international gold inflow as a fraction of the pre-harvest money supply and εms 
reflects other factors affecting the high-powered money supply (changes in the supply of 
nongold currency and/or the quantity of money held in Treasury vaults). 
   Gold inflow is reflected in the exchange rate:  
(5)   e  =  - ηg  +  εe 
where e is the post-harvest period's average dollar price of London sight exchange. Gold 
inflow is also equal to the balance of international payments from capital flows and net 
exports. Assuming exchange-rate fluctuations are too small to affect the relative price of 
foreign goods, a log approximation is:  
  (6)   g  =  θCF  ( i - i
* - Eė ) -  θy y  -  θp p +  εbop    
The first term on the right-hand side of (6) describes capital flow, determined by the 
spread between the domestic interest rate and the expected return to foreign short-term 
assets. i* denotes the London open-market bill rate. Eė is the expected future change in 
the log exchange rate over corresponding maturities. The next two terms account for   28
possible effects on net exports of nonagricultural output (through domestic demand for 
imports) and the price level (a higher domestic price level reduces the relative price of 
foreign goods).      
  Finally, expected inflation in (1) can be related to experienced inflation: 
  (7)   Eπ = - φπ ∆p + εEπ 
and exchange-rate expectations in (6) can be related to the average exchange rate: 
(8)   Eė= - φe e + εEe 
Making some substitutions gives nonagricultural output and gold inflow as functions of 
the domestic interest rate: 
(9)   y  =  [ - γr i + γlag y-1  + εy  - γr  ( φπ εp  - εEπ ) ] / β1  
where β1 = ( 1 + α φπ γr ). 
  (10)    g  =  [ - θy - θp p + θCF (  i - i
* ) + εbop + θCF ( φe εe -  εEe ) ]  / β2 
where β2 = (1+ θCF φeη). 
We must assume β1 > 0 : an exogenous increase in the domestic interest rate tends to 
reduce output. This condition is consistent with, but not limited to a case where φπ ≥ 0 , 
which holds if the price level is believed to be mean-reverting or a random walk – a 
plausible assumption for the gold standard era. We must also assume that β2 > 0 : an 
exogenous interest-rate hike tends to draw in gold. This condition is consistent with, but 
not limited to a case where φe > 0 , which holds if a relatively low exchange rate is 
accompanied by expectations of a future rise – again plausible under the gold standard. 
  Under these assumptions, variations in the model’s disturbance terms have the 
standard effects in Keynesian models. “IS shocks” εy create output fluctuations that are 
positively related to the domestic interest rate and the international interest-rate spread; 
under gold-standard conditions they are also positively related to gold inflow and money-
supply growth. “Money-demand shocks” εmd create output fluctuations that are positively   29
related to gold inflow and money-supply growth, but negatively related to the domestic 
interest rate and the international interest-rate spread. Both types of shocks, along with 
exogenous variations in the foreign interest rate i*, create positive relations between 
output and inflation. “Cost-push” shocks εp create negative correlations between output 
growth and inflation. Overall the model has no general implications for correlations 
between IP gaps and other variables. 
  Effects of harvest fluctuations enter the model through the disturbance terms. 
“Real” effects on production costs or spending correspond to relations between harvest 
fluctuations and gy in (1) and/or εp in (2). We focus instead on effects on net exports and 
money demand, which affect output and inflation through the interest rate i. 
  Denoting a crop’s harvest fluctuation by h, a positive effect on net exports means 
∂gbop / ∂h > 0 . By itself, this would create a positive relation between the harvest and 
nonagricultural output growth. For example, a positive balance-of-payments disturbance 
associated with a bumper harvest must be accompanied by some combination of a 
smaller international interest-rate spread and larger gold inflow (or smaller outflow) in 
expression (6). In (4), larger gold inflow means faster money-supply growth. From (3) 
and (1), faster money-supply growth must be accompanied by a decrease in the U.S. 
interest rate (matching the decrease in the international interest-rate spread) and an 
increase in nonagricultural output. 
  A positive effect of a crop’s harvest fluctuation on rural cash demand means a 
positive relation between the harvest and total demand for high-powered money at a 
given interest rate and level of nonagricultural output:  ∂gmd / ∂h > 0. Allowing for this 
money-demand effect along with the balance-of-payments effect gives: 
(11)   ∂∆y /∂h =  ( 1 / β3 ) [ ( 1 / β2 ) ∂gbop/∂h  -  ∂gmd/∂h ]      where  
   β3 =  α + μy + β1 (μi / γr ) + ( 1 / β2 ) ( θy + α θp + β1 ( θCF  / γr ) > 0 
(12)  ∂g /∂h =  ∂∆m /∂h  =  ∂gmd/∂h + ( α + μy +  β1 (μi / γr ) )  ∂∆y/∂h     30
(13)   ∂e/∂h =  -  η ( ∂g /∂h) 
(14)   ∂( i – i*) /∂h =  ∂∆i /∂h =  - ( β1 / γr )  ∂∆y/∂h     
(15)   ∂Δp/∂h =  α  ∂∆y/∂h 
  Expression (11) shows that a crop harvest is positively related to nonagricultural 
production only if its balance-of-payments effect is strong enough relative to its money-
demand effect. It is plausible that this could be true for cotton and not for wheat. For the 
cotton crop, export revenue was larger relative to crop sale income (Table 2). Also, the 
cotton belt’s peculiar credit institutions appear to have reduced the use of cash relative to 
credit, so southern rural cash demand may have been smaller relative to crop sale income. 
We hypothesize that cotton harvest fluctuations affected IP because their money-
demand effects were weak relative to their export-revenue effects. Wheat harvests failed 
to affect IP because their money-demand effects were relatively strong. 
Testable implications 
  If cotton harvests affected IP through this monetary channel, then cotton harvest 
fluctuations and cotton-caused variations in IP growth should be positively correlated 
with gold inflow and money-supply growth (expression 12);  negatively correlated with 
the exchange rate (expression 13); negatively correlated with the international interest-
rate spread and the change in the short-term interest rate (14); and positively correlated 
with price inflation (15) reflecting the interaction between an aggregate-demand shock 
and the Phillips curve. Importantly, these patterns need not hold for IP growth 
fluctuations due to causes other than the cotton harvest. These could appear uncorrelated 
with monetary quantities and interest rates, for example, if they reflected a mix of IS and 
money-demand shocks. Thus, one test of our explanation is to observe relations between 
IP growth and measures of the model’s other variables, comparing IP fluctuations most 
likely due to the cotton harvest with other IP fluctuations. 
  Another test of our explanation is to observe relations between variables and 
harvests of cotton, wheat and corn. If wheat harvest fluctuations failed to affect IP   31
because their associated money-demand shocks were strong relative to their effects on net 
exports, then wheat harvests should appear unrelated to inflation, the international 
interest-rate spread and the change in the domestic interest rate. But wheat harvests 
should be positively related to gold inflow and money-supply growth. Corn harvests 
should be unrelated to any of these variables. 
   VI. Tests: monetary quantities, interest and exchange rates, inflation 
  VI.A) Cotton-caused IP fluctuations versus other IP fluctuations 
  To observe relations between variables and IP changes most likely due to cotton, 
we ran 2SLS regressions on the first-difference of log IP, with IP change instrumented in 
the first stage by the preceding autumn’s cotton harvest fluctuation (deviation from 
quadratic trend). To observe relations between variables and IP changes more likely due 
to other causes, we ran OLS regressions on the residual from the first-stage regression of 
IP change on cotton. Finally, we ran OLS regressions on IP changes in general. 
  As left-hand side variables, for gold inflow we use total net gold imports over the 
months from July of the harvest season through the following June, as a fraction of the 
initial July’s high-powered money supply. High-powered money supply growth is the 
July-to-July change in the log of high-powered money. The exchange rate is the average 
New York dollar price of London sight exchange across months from harvest July 
through the following June. The international interest-rate spread is the average July-
through-June value for the New York commercial paper rate minus the London bill rate. 
The change in the domestic interest rate is the change in the average commercial paper 
rate from the July-to-June period preceding the harvest to the following July-to-June. For 
the change in the price level we use the July-to-July change in the log of wholesale price 
indexes, which are the only reliable cyclical-frequency measures of the price level in this 
period (Hanes 1999). The standard monthly wholesale price index for pre-1914 eras 
(Warren and Pearson [1932] linked to the BLS index) puts heavy weight on prices of raw 
cotton, wheat and corn. Therefore, in addition to the standard series we use a special WPI   32
constructed from the standard series’ components excluding raw farm products and foods 
(but including cotton textiles). Samples begin with 1879-1880, the first harvest season of 
the gold standard period. When the left-hand side variable is the international interest-rate 
spread, we add a dummy variable for post-1896 years, to allow for the change in the 
spread associated with the decreased probability of dollar devaluation. 
  Results for cotton-caused IP changes (2SLS regressions) are shown in Table XIII, 
row (a). All coefficients have signs consistent with the hypothesized monetary channel 
and are significantly different from zero at the five percent level or better. Results from 
regressions on other IP changes (residual from first stage of (a)), shown in (b), are 
different: coefficients are not significantly different from zero and some differ in sign 
from (a). Coefficients on IP changes in general, in (c), have magnitudes between those in 
(a) and (b). Estimated coefficients with inflation on the left-hand side (columns 6 and 7) 
are an exception: across (a), (b) and (c) all are positive, significant at 2 percent and about 
the same magnitude. This suggests all causes of IP fluctuations tended to create positive 
relations between output and inflation (cost-push shocks were unimportant). Coefficients 
on the post-1896 dummy variable for the international interest-rate spread, shown at the 
bottom of the Table, are all negative and significantly different from zero at one percent. 
  VI. B) Cotton versus wheat and corn harvests  
  Table XIV shows results of regressing the same LHS variables on cotton, wheat 
and corn harvest fluctuations (quadratic trends). We add one more LHS variable: a rough 
estimate of the change in (log) cash outside national banks, from the early-summer 
months preceding the harvest to the early-summer months of the following year. This is 
the closest one can get to cash held by the nonbank public, but it includes cash held by 
financial institutions other than national banks (see data appendix). In addition to OLS 
regressions we ran three sets of 2SLS regressions, one for each crop, using Table VIII’s 
weather variables. OLS estimates are most efficient if harvest fluctuations generally were 
caused by exogenous events. But 2SLS regressions are a useful check for wheat, given   33
Table IV's evidence of a positive relation between wheat harvest fluctuations and IP in 
the same year. 
  OLS results in panel A are consistent with predicted differences across crops. For 
growth in cash outside national banks, gold inflow or the change in high-powered money 
supply, both the cotton and wheat harvest coefficients are positive and significantly 
different from zero at the five percent level or better. For the exchange rate, both the 
cotton and wheat coefficients are negative and significant at the two percent level or 
better. For the international interest-rate spread and the interest-rate change, only the 
cotton coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero. Corn harvest 
coefficients for these variables are generally of small magnitude, not significantly 
different from zero. For inflation, results depend somewhat on the price index. For the 
standard WPI the corn coefficient is negative and significant at the ten percent level. For 
the WPI excluding farm and food prices, the corn coefficient is much smaller in 
magnitude and not significantly different from zero, suggesting that the corn harvest’s 
negative effect on the standard WPI merely reflects its direct effect on corn prices (which 
have heavy weight in the standard WPI). For either WPI, the cotton harvest coefficient is 
positive and significant at five percent.  In 2SLS results, panel B, cotton coefficients are 
similar in magnitude to their OLS counterparts, as are wheat coefficients for monetary 
quantities and exchange rates. They generally have larger standard errors, so some are not 
significant at conventional levels.   
VII. Conclusion 
  From about 1880 to the First World War, fluctuations in the cotton harvest due to 
weather, crop diseases and other factors exogenous to the industrial economy caused 
most major American business cycles, including the depressions of 1884, 1893, 1895 and 
1910. This phenomenon is apparent in the relation between harvest fluctuations and 
measures of industrial production (IP). Wheat and corn harvests did not affect IP. Cotton 
harvests did not affect IP in the antebellum era.   34
  We explain the unique postbellum effect of cotton harvests on IP as the outcome 
of interactions between harvests, export revenues and high-powered money demand. 
Under America’s gold-standard regime of 1879-1914, a positive export-revenue shock 
tended to boost nonagricultural output as it allowed for larger gold inflows, faster growth 
in the high-powered money supply and lower U.S. interest rates. A positive money-
demand shock tended to depress nonagricultural output as it boosted high-powered 
money supply through gold inflows but increased U.S. interest rates. In the 1879-1914 
period, cotton harvests affected IP because they were positively related to export revenue 
and their money-demand effects were relatively weak. Wheat harvests failed to affect IP 
because their money-demand effects were stronger relative to their export-revenue 
effects. In the antebellum era, cotton harvests failed to affect IP because they were not 
positively related to export revenue. 
Data on international gold flows, interest rates, exchange rates and inflation are 
consistent with our monetary explanation of the cotton harvest’s effect on IP. Large 
cotton harvests boosted gold inflows, money-supply growth and the foreign exchange 
value of the dollar, while they decreased American short-term interest rates and 
American interest rates relative to London rates. Large wheat harvests boosted gold 
inflows, the money supply and the dollar’s exchange value but did not decrease U.S. 
interest rates. Of course, we have left many aspects of this mechanism unexplored in this 
paper, including the role of financial panics in the transmission of the cotton harvest’s 
monetary shock to industrial output, and the possibility that a variant of the mechanism 
was already at work in the later 1870s.  
  We believe that alternative explanations based on real channels may prove 
difficult to reconcile with the lack of an IP effect from the wheat or corn harvests, the 
lack of a cotton effect on British IP, and the positive effect of cotton harvests on price 
inflation, which is consistent with interactions between a Phillips curve and aggregate 
demand shocks, rather than supply shocks. But whether or not we are correct about the   35
channel from the cotton harvest to nonagricultural production, our results leave little 
doubt that cotton harvest fluctuations were the ultimate, exogenous cause of many pre-
World War I business cycles.  
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Data appendix 
General note: “NBER series” refers to National Bureau of Economic Research Macro 
History database (http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/) 
Values of crop-related exports: Export values starting 1851 are from USDA, Bureau of 
Statistics (1910) and USDA Yearbook (1913, 1916). Value of cotton exports for earlier 
years from USDA, Bureau of Statistics (1912).  Wheat (and flour) and corn (and meal) 
exports for the earlier years from the U.S. Department of Treasury (1848, 1849, 1850, 
1851). All of these figures are based on U.S. customs officials’ estimates of outward 
shipment values, which were supposed to reflect the actual current selling price of the 
commodity shipped. Annual figures for years before 1843 are for twelve-month spans 
ending September 30th. After 1843, figures are for spans ending June 30th. Figures for 
1843 cover the nine months from October 1842 through June 1843. We exclude that 
year's figure from our samples.   
 
Commodity market crop prices: Cotton prices on the New York cotton exchange, through 
1861 from Cole (1938); beginning September 1870 from NBER (series 04006a); for 
years ending June 1870 and June 1871 calculated from quarterly data in Mitchell (1908, 
Appendix Table II.). Wheat and corn prices in Chicago from NBER (04001, 04005).  
 
U.S. high-powered money supply and components: Monthly data on components of the 
high-powered money stock begin with June 1878 (Friedman and Schwartz 1970, pp. 205-
211): high-powered money outside the Treasury (NBER 14135); gold held in the 
Treasury (NBER 14137). Nongold money outside the Treasury calculated as money 
outside the Treasury minus gold (gold coins and gold certificates) outside the Treasury 
(14131). Total monetary gold, in or outside the Treasury, is NBER 14076. 
 
U.K. high-powered money supply: Capie and Webber (1985), Table I.1, “Monetary 
Base.” 
 
International gold inflow to U.S.: Monthly net gold export from NBER 14112. 
 
New York – London exchange rate: Neal and Weidenmier (2003) collected weekly-
frequency New York bid and ask prices for London exchange from the New York 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle. Weidenmier kindly provided these data (at the 
time of this writing, available on his website ebutts05.tripod.com/nealweidenmiergsd). 
We calculate monthly averages of the bid-ask mean, for sight exchange. For most weeks, 
the Commercial and Financial Chronicle gave exchange rates as dollar prices per pound 
sterling. For some weeks in January 1881, exchange rates were given as percent of par 
value, during a short-lived effort by foreign-exchange dealers to shift the market to 
quotations on that basis (Myers 1931, p. 347). For these weeks, we assumed a par value 
of $4.8665. We corrected the Commercial and Financial Chronicle quote for January 8, 
1881, faithfully reproduced in the Neal-Weidenmier database. This was the first week 
that exchange dealers gave quotes as percent of par, and the Chronicle wrongly recorded 
the percent figures as dollar figures. (Converted to dollars, the values for this week are 
bid 4.8242, ask 4.83.) For months prior to January 1880, sight exchange rates taken from 
Schneider, Schwarzer and Zellfelder (1991, p. 330).    
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Interest rates:   New York commercial paper rate is NBER series 13002. London open-
market bill rate is NBER series 13016.   
  
WPI: Warren and Pearson (1932) wholesale price index before 1890 linked to the BLS 
wholesale price index thereafter (NBER series m04048).  Index excluding farm products 
and foods is calculated from the other component indexes using Warren and Pearson’s 
1889 weights (p. 184).  
 
Cash outside national banks: For national banks only, Annual Reports of the Comptroller 
of the Currency give figures on vault cash (the sum of a bank’s holdings of specie, 
fractional currency, Treasury-issued notes and national bank notes issued by other banks) 
at Call Report dates, available as NBER series 14177. Call Reports took place at irregular 
points in the year.  To estimate cash outside national banks in spring and early summer, 
we took call reports occurring in the months of May, June or July. We subtracted this 
vault cash figure from the average value of high-powered money outside the Treasury 
across May, June, and July. 
 
Weather variables: Weather station data are available from the United States Historical 
Climatology Network (USHCN, 
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/ushcn/ushcn.html) and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, Nineteenth Century U.S. Climate Data Set Project 
(lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/onlinedata/forts/forts.html ). Temperature data are 
available beginning in 1822; precipitation data in 1838. To create a monthly weather 
variable for the cotton belt, we used observations of all weather stations located in North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, 
Arkansas, and Texas; for the grain belt, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas.  For 
each variable and region, we ran a fixed-effect regression with dummies for each year 
and weather station.  Estimated coefficients on year dummies are our measure of the 
monthly weather variable.   38
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Table I:  Descriptive Statistics: IP and Harvest Deviations from Trend 
A) 
Trend:                                       Quadratic                                                                        Hodrick-Prescott                                         
Series:                   IP                            Cotton                Wheat       Corn                      IP                       Cotton                Wheat       Corn                                
Period     1828-         1869-        1828-        1869-       1869-        1869-          1828-         1869-        1828-        1869-       1869-        1869- 
    1860       1913  1860      1913        1913   1913           1860     1913          1860    1913        1913  1913    
           (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)            (5)             (6)             (7)             (8)            (9)            (10)           (11)          (12)            
Max.   0.175    0.115   0.229     0.203   0.228    0.159   0.117    0.115     0.209     0.234     0.239     0.170   
Min.   -0.186    -0.164   -0.227    -0.224   -0.201  -0.373   -0.136    -0.147   -0.223   -0.223    -0.192    -0.374   
                
Std. Dev.  0.101    0.082   0.116     0.116   0.120    0.139    0.066    0.069    0.111    0.112    0.110    0.133 
               
Serial   0.76    0.60    -0.152    -0.21    0.02    -0.11    0.54    0.47   -0.22    -0.28    -0.15    -0.18   
 Corr.                
 Coeff.              
 
B)  Contemporaneous Correlations 
                               1828-1860                                1869-1913                                            
                                IP                         IP             Cotton          Wheat 
 Cotton     -0.210     -0.14     
         
 Wheat       0.16       0.13   
       
 Corn       -0.16      0.12        -0.02   48
Table II: Statistics on staple crops 1840-1910 
       P e r   c e n t  
     1840-1860 1869-1913 1880-1913 
Exports/U.S. merchandise exports 
  Cotton        51.7   29.3   25.6       
 Wheat and wheat flour             14.0    13.0 
  Corn and corn meal                3.9     3.6 
Value of harvested crop/GNP 
 Cotton  *             3.6    2.4    2.3 
  Wheat               3.0   2.6 
 Corn                                      6.3    5.9 
Farmers' income from crop sales/GNP 
 Cotton             3.6    2.4    2.3  
  Wheat        2.5   2.2 
  Corn          1.3   1.2 
Export revenues/farmers' income from crop sales 
  Cotton           91.7   71.4   71.4 
 Wheat and wheat flour        35.0    37.1                      
    Corn        18.7   18.9 
Cotton consumed (value)/GNP 
  U.S.**                                        0.8                 1.1                 0.9 
   Britain***                              3.6      3.1    2.7 
Cotton consumed (value)/Nonagricultural GNP 
  U.S.**                                                   1.4                 1.4                1.2 
  Britain***                                   4.5                 3.4                2.9 
Imports of U.S. cotton by Britain (value) 
  /GNP***                                     3.0                 2.8              2.4   
 /Nonagricultural GNP***                      3.8                 3.1              2.6  
    
* 1840-1860 average of values for 1839, 1844, 1849, 1854, 1859.   
**Averages of values for 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900. 
***Averages of values for 1841, 1851, 1861, 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901, 1907. 
 
Sources: 
Crop exports/ merchandise exports: Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition (2006): Series Ee366, 
Ee571, Ee576.  Corn exports valued at Chicago prices in Agricultural Statistics, 1936, pp. 32-33. 
Value of harvest crop/GNP: 1840-1860 is cotton’s value added from Gallman (1960, pp. 46-47) over GNP from 
Gallman (1966,  p. 26). 1869-1913 and 1880-1913 are calendar-year crop farm value from Strauss and Bean (1937, pp.  
36, 39-40, 64-65) over GNP from Balke and Gordon (1989, pp. 84-85). 
Farmers' income from crop sales/ GNP: 1840-1860 are cotton’s value added from Gallman (1960, pp. 46-47) over 
GNP from Gallman (1966,  p. 26). 1869-1913 and 1880-1913 are calendar-year crop "gross income" from Strauss and 
Bean (1940, pp.  36, 39-40, 64-65) over GNP from Balke and Gordon (1989, pp. 84-85). 
Cotton consumption as share of national income: U.S. GNP from Historical Statistics (2006) series Ca10. 
Nonagricultural GNP calculated using share of U.S. GNP outside agriculture from Gallman (2000, p. 50). U.S. cotton 
consumption from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1911, p. 21). U.S. cotton price (to value consumption) from Historical 
Statistics  (2006), series Cc222, Cc223. British GNP, nonagricultural GNP, cotton consumption quantities, cotton 
import quantities, and cotton prices (to value quantities) from Mitchell (1988, pp. 332, 334, 760, 822).  
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Table III: Crop export revenue, cotton exports and crop prices, 1829-60 and 1870-1913 
Coefficient 
[Standard error] 
LHS     p-value 
variable:    Total crop export revenue                Cotton export quantity             Crop price, year following harvest                                    
                              Cotton                  Wheat         Corn     
Period:          1829-        1870-         1870-         1829-    1870-            1829-           1870-     1870-           1870 
                1860*         1913          1913            1860*     1913             1860*           1913       1913           -1913 
                (1)             (2)             (3)                (4)                 (5)              (6)                (7)               (8)                (9)                                
Cotton(-1)    0.019     0.640    0.534   1.333    1.062    -0.868    -0.500       
    [0.295]    [0.168]   [0.137]  [0.133]   [0.050]    [0.303]    [0.148]       
   0.95    0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00    0.01    0.00         
Wheat(-1)          0.589                 -0.151     
         [0.132]         [0.193]     
        0.00           0.44       
Corn(-1)        0.210              -0.815   
        [0.115]           [0.151]   
        0.08             0.00   
Pre-   0.862    0.325    0.312        0.703    1.053    0.581   2.003 
harvest  [0.292]   [0.300]   [0.243]       [0.323]   [0.265]   [0.355]  [0.320] 
 WPI    0.01    0.29    0.20        0.04   0.00    0.11   0.00   
               
Time   0.034    0.021    0.020   0.106   0.051    -0.094    -0.025    -0.010   0.067 
  [0.058]   [0.018]   [0.015]  [0.025]  [0.002]    [0.063]   [0.016]    [0.022]   [0.020] 
   0.56    0.26    0.19   0.00   0.00    0.15   0.14    0.64   0.00 
Time Sqr   0.135    -0.045    0.014    -0.418   -0.373    0.728    0.508    0.196    -0.979   
 / 1000  [0.451]    [-0.333]   [0.269]    [0.190]   [0.040]   [0.489]   [0.294]   [0.394]    [0.356]   
   0.77    0.99    0.96    0.04    0.00   0.15    0.09    0.62    0.01   
               
 R2   0.90    0.79    0.87    0.98    0.99   0.41    0.88    0.52    0.76 
 *Excluding 1843     Sources: see data appendix   50
Table IV: Harvest Fluctuations Regressed on Current and Lagged IP Gaps 
       C o e f f i c i e n t  
       [ s t a n d a r d   e r r o r ]  
       p-value 
Trend:                              Quadratic        Hodrick-Prescott    
Period:                        1829-                              1870-1913                          1829-                        1870-1913                     
                          1860                                                                           1860 
 LHS variable:            Cotton        Cotton          Wheat            Corn          Cotton             Cotton          Wheat            Corn 
                    (1)               (2)                (3)                (4)                 (5)                (6)                (7)               (8)                    
IP     -0.060        -0.084    0.471     -0.141    0.018    -0.045    0.581    -0.222   
      [0.317]      [0.322]   [0.279]    [0.318]   [0.361]    [0.334]   [0.266]    [0.323]   
    0.85      0.80    0.10     0.66    0.96    0.89   0.03    0.50     
 IP(-1)    -0.321     0.011    -0.412   -0.153    -0.383    0.069    -0.132   -0.228   
     [0.325]    [0.302]    [0.275]   [0.319]    [0.363]   [0.303]    [0.267]   [0.327]   
     0.33     0.97     0.14    0.63     0.30    0.82     0.62    0.49   
 
 Crop(-1)      -0.223    -0.186     -0.002   -0.130     -0.241    -0.259   -0.218    -0.208   
     [0.183]    [0.184]     [0.157]   [0.154]     [0.181]    [0.184]   [0.154]    [0.152]   
      0.23     0.32      0.99    0.40      0.19     0.17    0.17    0.18   
  p - v a l u e            
   test 1      0.32     0.58     0.37    0.67     0.41     0.35    0.13    0.37   
   test 2       0.25     0.95     0.21    0.59      0.48      0.97    0.09    0.42 
  
  Test 1: coefficients on all RHS variables equal to zero 
  Test 2: coefficients on IP and IP(-1) equal to zero 
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Table V: IP Gaps Regressed on Lagged Harvest Fluctuations 
 Coefficient 
 [standard  error]   
A)   p-value 
 Trend      Quadratic                                                  
    IP series                  Davis             Davis exc. textiles, food    Davis metals        Davis machinery  
    Period           1830-          1871-         1830-      1871-         1830-      1871-          1830-      1871-  
               1860          1913           1860        1913          1860         1913          1860         1913  
                  (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)              (5)             (6)            (7)             (8) 
 Cotton(-1)    -0.045   0.331   -0.169   0.315    -0.127    0.360     0.055    0.481 
    [0.106]  [0.081]   [0.110]  [0.093]    [0.274]   [0.152]   [0.241]   [0.193] 
     0.68    0.00    0.14   0.00    0.65    0.02    0.82   0.02 
           
 Wheat(-1)       0.003     0.012       -0.051      0.091 
    [0.083]   [0.096]     [0.157]      [0.196] 
      0.96     0.90     0.75      0.64 
           
 Corn(-1)      -0.007      -0.009     0.030      -0.004 
     [0.068]      [0.078]    [0.127]      [0.161] 
      0.92      0.91     0.81       0.98 
           
 IP(-1)   0.917    0.790    1.037    0.795    0.374    0.484    1.150    1.022 
  [0.181]   [0.162]   [0.172]   [0.163]   [0.187]   [0.164]   [0.174]    [0.158] 
    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.06    0.01    0.00    0.00 
           
 Cotton(-2)    0.068   0.007    0.167    0.013    0.313    0.116    0.280    -0.044 
   [0.109]  [0.099]   [0.116]   [0.110]   [0.269]   [0.167]   [0.249]    [0.221] 
    0.54   0.95    0.16   0.91    0.25    0.49    0.27   0.84 
           
 Wheat(-2)      -0.095      -0.087       -0.211      -0.142 
     [0.077]      [0.088]     [0.142]      [0.180] 
      0.22       0.33      0.15      0.44 
           
 Corn(-2)      0.051      0.059     0.082      0.137 
     [0.067]     [0.076]     [0.122]     [0.157] 
      0.45      0.45      0.51      0.39 
         
 IP(-2)    -0.172    -0.180    -0.277   -0.193    -0.105    -0.081   -0.432    -0.346 
    [0.186]    [0.152]    [0.174]   [0.155]     [0.198]   [0.161]   [0.181]   [0.154] 
     0.36     0.25    0.12    0.22     0.60    0.62    0.02    0.03 
           
 p-value1       0.50    0.36    0.14    0.43    0.40    0.42    0.04    0.15 
1 p-value for test of hypothesis that all coefficients on second lags equal to zero  52
      A) (cont)            
    Trend                                    HP                      Quadratic 
    IP series                                                          Davis                   Frickey  
    Period                                      1830-      1871-              1871-  
                                                        1860         1913               1913  
                                (9)             (10)         (11)            
 Cotton(-1)    -0.017    0.334    0.323 
    [0.089]   [0.075   [0.103] 
     0.85    0.00   0.00 
     
 Wheat(-1)      0.017    -0.030 
     [0.082]    [0.107] 
      0.84    0.78 
     
 Corn(-1)      -0.013    -0.047 
      [0.064]    [0.087] 
       0.84     0.60 
     
 IP(-1)    0.634     0.625     0.534 
   [0.171]    [0.159]    [0.165] 
    0.00     0.00    0.00 
     
 Cotton(-2)    0.074     0.047    0.102 
   [0.091]    [0.091]   [0.112] 
     0.42     0.61    0.39 
     
 Wheat(-2)      -0.091   -0.128 
      [0.078]   [0.097] 
       0.25    0.196 
     
 Corn(-2)      0.048    0.058 
     [0.064]   [0.083] 
       0.46    0.49 
   
 IP(-2)    -0.158    -0.197    -0.102 
    [0.174]    [0.145]    [0.162] 
     0.37     0.18     0.54 
     
 p-value      0.45    0.19    0.39 
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B) 
     Trend                                                             Quadratic                                                                   
                      Davis             Davis metals               Davis machinery 
    IP series                Davis              exc. textiles, food                                  
    Period         1829-     1870-        1829-        1870-          1829-       1870-           1829-        1870- 
             1860       1913         1860         1913           1860         1913             1860         1913              
                (1)           (2)             (3)             (4)              (5)             (6)              (7)              (8) 
 Cotton(-1)   -0.047    0.312    -0.172    0.293      -0.125     0.315     -0.009    0.494 
   [0.107]   [0.078]    [0.115]   [0.088]    [0.248]    [0.142]     [0.258]   [0.188] 
    0.67    0.00    0.14   0.00     0.62    0.03      0.97    0.01 
            
 Wheat(-1)      0.036     0.051        0.015        0.148 
     [0.076]    [0.086]     [0.140]     [0.182] 
      0.64     0.56      0.91      0.42 
            
 Corn(-1)     -0.018      -0.023      0.007      -0.035 
     [0.065]      [0.074]     [0.119]      [0.160] 
      0.79      0.75      0.95      0.83 
            
 IP(-1)    0.769    0.640    0.792    0.644    0.345     0.449     0.787    0.742 
   [0.126]   [0.110]   [0.114]   [0.111]   [0.170]    [0.136]    [0.120]    [0.104] 
    0.00    0.00    0.00   0.00    0.05     0.00     0.00    0.00 
    Trend                                                                 HP                   Quadratic 
      IP series                                     Davis                 Frickey                                
          Period                                                 1829-         1870-        1870- 
                                                           1860          1913          1913              
                                                           (9)             (10)             (11)  
 Cotton(-1)    -0.022    0.307    0.290 
    [0.093]   [0.073]   [0.097] 
     0.81     0.00   0.00 
     
 Wheat(-1)      0.061    0.027 
     [0.076]   [0.095] 
      0.43    0.78 
     
 Corn(-1)     -0.015   -0.048 
     [0.062]   [0.081] 
      0.81    0.56 
     
 IP(-1)    0.537   0.498    0.477 
   [0.158]   [0.123]   [0.132] 
    0.00    0.00   0.00 
       54




IP = Const. + Dummy1870-1879 + βCotton(-1) + γ (Dummy1870-1879*Cotton(-1)) + η IP(-1)        
 
                    Davis exc.       
IP Series                               Davis                          text. & food            
Trend                   Quadratic            HP          Quadratic        HP            
                                     (1)               (2)                (3)                (4)          
 β    0.380      0.377     0.374     0.370 
Cotton(-1)   [0.080]     [0.078]    [0.092]    [0.089] 
    0.00      0.00     0.00     0.00 
      
 γ    -0.367    -0.327    -0.430     -0.375 
 Cotton(-1)    [0.179]    [0.169]    [0.204]     [0.194] 
 coefficient     0.05     0.06     0.04      0.06 
    shift         
      
 η     0.636    0.533     0.643    0.542 
 IP(-1)    [0.102]   [0.113]    [0.104]   [0.116] 
     0.00    0.00     0.00    0.00 
      
 β + γ     0.012     0.050     -0.055     -0.006 
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Table VII: Harvest fluctuations and weather variables 
 
   1871-1913  (harvests  1870-1912)   1880-1913 (harvests 1879-1912)                      
       R 2    Rbar2 F-stat   p-value       R2      Rbar2     F-stat   p-value   
Cotton harvest on 
  cotton weather   0.43   0.32   3.812    0.00          0.61     0.51      5.824        0.00 
  wheat weather  0.17     -0.06    0.726     0.68           0.26   -0.02       0.943        0.51 
   corn weather   0.21     -0.00    0.993     0.46           0.28     0.02      1.063        0.42 
Wheat harvest on 
   cotton weather   0.12    -0.052    0.705    0.67           0.20    -0.02      0.930        0.50 
   wheat weather  0.29      0.09     1.469     0.20          0.60      0.45      3.988        0.00 
   corn weather   0.23      0.018    1.087    0.40          0.33      0.08      1.339        0.27 
Corn harvest on 
   cotton weather   0.19       0.03      1.188      0.33        0.22     0.00      1.019        0.44        
   wheat weather  0.18      -0.05      0.790      0.63        0.19    -0.11      0.629        0.76 
   corn weather   0.67       0.58   7.381         0.00        0.65      0.52      4.920        0.00 
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Table VIII IV estimates, Harvest effects on IP 
 
A) 2SLS regressions, IP gap on harvest fluctuations and lagged IP gap 
     1871-1913 
LHS variable              IP gap, quadratic       ΔLn(IP) 
          Cotton    Wheat         Corn  Cotton     Wheat     Corn 
             (1)           (2)             (3)           (4)               (5)             (6)           
 Crop(-1)    0.444    0.101     0.006    0.502    0.035    0.041 
   [0.121]   [0.166]    [0.097]   [0.134]  [0.182]  [0.106] 
    0.00    0.55    0.95    0.00    0.85    0.70 
          
 IP(-1)    0.669    0.572    0.597       
   [0.111]   [0.131]   [0.129]       
    0.00    0.00    0.00     
          
  R2*    0.52    0.37    0.36    0.25    0.00    0.01 
   
1880-1913 
LHS variable     IP gap, quadratic                      ΔLn(IP) 
           Cotton    Wheat      Corn  Cotton     Wheat     Corn 
             (1)           (2)             (3)           (4)               (5)             (6)       
 Crop(-1)    0.467   0.088    -0.011    0.517    0.038     -0.019 
   [0.108]  [0.127]    [0.108]   [0.124]  [0.146]    [0.125] 
     0.00   0.49     0.92    0.00    0.79     0.88 
          
 IP(-1)    0.585   0.442    0.478         
   [0.123]  [0.159]   [0.154]       
    0.00   0.01    0.00     
          
  R2*    0.52    0.27       0.24         0.37     0.00       0.00 
 
*Using TSLS coefficient estimates on actual harvest fluctuations (structural residuals)   57
B) Corresponding OLS estimates 
1871-1913 
LHS variable             IP gap, quadratic        ΔLn(IP) 
          Cotton    Wheat         Corn  Cotton     Wheat     Corn 
    (1)     (2)             (3)            (4)            (5)           (6)   
Crop(-1)    0.321    0.081    0.014   0.353    0.034    0.050 
   [0.076]   [0.088]   [0.079]  [0.084]   [0.097]  [0.087] 
    0.00    0.36    0.86   0.00    0.73    0.56 
          
 IP(-1)    0.648    0.576    0.599       
   [0.106]   [0.127]   [0.128]       
    0.00    0.00    0.00     
             




LHS variable          IP gap, quadratic                 ΔLn(IP) 
          Cotton     Wheat      Corn         Cotton    Wheat         Corn   
             (1)            (2)         (3)   (4)        (5)   (6)      
 Crop(-1)   0.372     0.125     -0.001    0.421    0.032     0.009 
  [0.080]   [0.099]     [0.087]   [0.093]  [0.113]   [0.101] 
    0.00    0.22      0.99    0.00    0.78     0.93 
          
 IP(-1)    0.564    0.427    0.479       
   [0.120]   [0.156]   [0.154]       
    0.00    0.01     0.00     
          
R2     0.55     0.27      0.24    0.39    0.00     0.00 
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 Table IX: Cotton harvests and British versus American IP, 1880-1913 





1829-1860        1870-1913     1880-1913    
  LHS variable     IP US            IP UK           IP US            IP UK          IP US             IP UK 
                                      (1)                  (2)                (3)                (4)                 (5)                (6) 
 Cotton(-1)    -0.083      0.115    0.292     0.036    0.340    0.067 
    [0.110]   [0.060]   [0.079]    [0.049]   [0.087]   [0.057] 
     0.46    0.07    0.00     0.46    0.00    0.25 
        
 IP (-1)     0.754   0.214    0.616    0.390    0.534    0.295 
    [0.126]  [0.179]   [0.113]   [0.133]   [0.124]   [0.057] 
     0.00   0.24    0.00    0.01    0.00    0.25 
        
Other     0.406    0.096    0.217    0.140    0.266    0.089 
  country IP     [0.328]   [0.068]   [0.235]   [0.071]   [0.270]   [0.092] 
     0.23    0.17    0.36    0.05    0.33    0.34 
        
R2     0.60    0.15    0.56    0.33    0.56    0.28 
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Table X: Harvests and Treasury money supply factors 
 1880-1913 
LHS variables: 
(1) Change in log (nongold money outside the Treasury, average of months from July to June) 






                                         (1)                  (2)                  
 Cotton(-1)     0.032    0.004 
    [0.039]   [0.236] 
    0.42    0.98 
    
 Wheat(-1)    0.046    0.095 
   [0.037]   [0.224] 
    0.22    0.67 
    
  Corn(-1)    0.015    0.202 
   [0.032]   [0.196] 
    0.64   0.31 
    
  R2    0.10    0.04 
 





Table XI: Volatility in high-powered money supply, international gold flow and crop 
export revenue, 1880-1913 
  Percent of preceding July’s high-powered money supply  
       
  ΔMoney   Gold   Crop-related export revenue  
    supply   inflow Cotton   Wheat Corn 
Mean      4.4    2.9    16.8     8.8    2.5 
 
Standard deviation       4.7           4.0                3.3                 5.6           1.5 
 
Maximum minus      24.4         17.2    13.8               26.1          5.9      
       minimum 
  Sources: see data appendix 
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  Table XII: Harvests and British interest rates or money supply 
 1880-1913 
LHS variables: 
(1) Change in London bill rate (average of months from July to June) 
(2) Change in log (U.K. high-powered money, average of months from July to June) 






                                         (1)                  (2)                 (3)                    
 Cotton(-1)    -1.321   -0.053   -0.029 
    [1.225]   [0.042]   [0.063] 
     0.30    0.21    0.66 
      
 Wheat(-1)    -0.312    0.009    -0.007 
    [1.166]   [0.040]     [0.060] 
     0.79    0.83      0.91 
      
  Corn(-1)    1.277   -0.023     -0.037 
   [1.200]   [0.035]     [0.053] 
    0.22    0.52      0.49 
      
  R2    0.08    0.07      0.03 
 
Sources: see data appendix   61
Table XIII: Cotton-caused IP fluctuations versus other IP fluctuations, 1880-1913 
 
Left-hand side variables: 
 
Δg    Net gold imports/ money supply (previous July) 
Δm    Change in high-powered money stock (outside the Treasury), July to July 
e   Exchange rate, annual average ending June 
(i – i*)  New York – London interest rate spread, annual average ending June 
Δi    Change in New York interest rate (annual average ending June) 
Δp WPI Change in log WPI, July to July 




(a) Two-stage least squares with cotton harvest deviation as instrument for  Δy  
(b) OLS with residual variation in  Δy as RHS variable 





                Δp   
          Δg     Δm              e              (i – i*)           Δi           WPI           WPI  exc.                                                   
(1)             (2)             (3)            (4)             (5)              (6)              (7)  
      (a)    0.284    0.350   -0.083   -4.155     -7.262    0.459   0.542 
   [0.124]    [0.174]   [0.038]   [1.902]    [3.314]   [0.192]  [0.193] 
    0.03    0.05   0.04    0.04    0.04    0.02   0.01 
        
      (b)    0.055   -0.082      0.019    -1.105    -1.284    0.493    0.518 
   [0.098]   [0.126]    [0.027]    [1.533]    [2.626]   [0.166]   [0.171] 
   0.58    0.52    0.48    0.48    0.63    0.01    0.00 
        
      (c)    0.144    0.086    -0.021    -2.289    -3.604   0.480    0.527 
   [0.073]   [0.098]   [0.021]    [1.137]    [1.961]   [0.120]   [0.120] 
   0.06    0.39    0.34     0.05    0.08    0.00    0.00 
  
Post-1896 dummy for  (i – i*):   Coefficients [standard error] 
     (a)  –1.256  [0.188] 
     (b)  –1.263  [0.191] 
     (c)  –1.258  [0.181]   
Sources: see data appendix  62
Table XIV: Macroeconomic variables and crop fluctuations, 1880-1913 
 
Left-hand side variables: 
∆Cash     Change in log cash outside national banks, spring to spring 




A) OLS results                             Δp   
    ∆Cash               Δg            Δm              e              (i – i*)            Δi           WPI           WPI  exc.                                
(1)             (2)             (3)            (4)             (5)             (6)              (7)            (8)               
Cotton(-1)    0.148     0.095    0.120    -0.027    -1.883    -3.592    0.192    0.205   
     [0.063]    [0.044]   [0.058]    [0.011]    [0.779]    [1.247]   [0.093]   [0.096]   
    0.03    0.04    0.05    0.02    0.02     0.01    0.05    0.04   
          
Wheat(-1)    0.132     0.103    0.124    -0.036    0.781    2.182   0.071    0.122   
    [0.060]    [0.042]   [0.056]    [0.011]   [0.742]   [1.187]  [0.088]   [0.092]   
    0.04    0.02   0.03    0.00    0.30    0.08   0.43    0.20   
          
Corn(-1)    0.049     0.048    0.058    -0.009    -0.186    1.220    -0.135    -0.002   
   [0.052]    [0.037]   [0.049]    [0.009]    [0.650]   [1.038]   [0.077]    [0.080]   
    0.36    0.20   0.24    0.35    0.78    0.25   0.09    0.98 
            
R2    0.32   0.35   0.31    0.44    0.66    0.28   0.21    0.20 
 
B) 2SLS results  
                 Δp   
    ∆Cash               Δg               Δm               e             (i – i*)            Δi           WPI           WPI exc.                                  
(1)             (2)             (3)            (4)             (5)              (6)              (7)            (8)                
Cotton(-1)   0.179     0.064    0.085   -0.023   -1.683    -2.654    0.232    0.338   
    [0.084]    [0.062]   [0.080]   [0.017]   [0.942]    [1.646]   [0.119]   [0.123]   
   0.04    0.31    0.30    0.18    0.08    0.12    0.06   0.01 
        
Wheat(-1)    0.153    0.122    0.145   -0.041    0.264    1.604    0.003    0.039   
     [0.081]   [0.057]   [0.074]   [0.015]   [0.972]   [1.663]   [0.121]   [0.124]   
    0.07   0.04    0.06    0.01    0.79    0.34   0.98   0.76 
                
Corn(-1)    -0.027    0.032    -0.027    0.007    -0.961    0.423    -0.247   -0.116   
      [0.078]   [0.057]    [0.072]   [0.015]    [0.829]   [1.442]    [0.105]   [0.111]   
     0.73   0.58    0.71   0.66    0.26    0.77    0.02    0.31 
Post 1896 dummy for (i – i*): Coefficients [standard error] 
      OLS:      -1.252 [0.181] 
    TSLS, cotton:    -1.245 [0.178] 
    TSLS, wheat:    -1.264  [0.192] 
    TSLS, corn:       -1.237  [0.196] 
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   FIGURE  II  A) 
  ΔLn(IP) and Cotton Harvest Fluctuation, 1870-1913 
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    F I G U R E   I I   C )  
  ΔLn(IP) and Wheat Harvest Fluctuation, 1870-1913 
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   FIGURE  II  D) 
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   FIGURE  III  A) 
  IP Gaps Forecast by Cotton Harvest Fluctuations, 1871-1913 
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  FIGURE  III  B) 
  IP Gaps Forecast by Cotton Harvest Fluctuations, 1871-1913 
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       Figure  IV  B) 